Norway, previously an international frontrunner concerning reductions of transboundary air pollution, fell far short of its 2010 target for nitrogen oxides (NO x ) under the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol. In this article I show that leading international compliance theories cannot explain much of this noncompliance. While little evidence supports the management school's explanations, Norwegian policies are also inconsistent with the enforcement school. Albeit too late to meet the deadline, Norway imposed a NO x tax in 2007. Moreover, the resulting emissions reductions were deeper than in a businessas-usual scenario, despite no international enforcement. That the NO x tax was imposed only after an environmentalist party gained considerable influence over NO x policies in 2005 supports an office-incumbent hypothesis. However, as emissions also declined significantly in many other European countries after 2005, the explanation is likely structural. One possibility is the deadline-pressure hypothesis: As the deadline approached, decision-makers across Northern and Western Europe considered emissions reductions to be more urgent than before.
Using an in-depth case study, I aim to explain this noncompliance. I find that neither the enforcement school (Downs et al. 1996; Barrett 2003) nor the management school as formulated by Chayes (1993, 1995 ; see also Young 1979 ) explains Norway's noncompliance and NO x policies well. I thus turn to two alternative explanations, the office-incumbent hypothesis and a deadline-pressure hypothesis. I find that both of these alternative explanations are consistent with the Norwegian case; however, only the latter is also consistent with the emissions trajectories of other Gothenburg countries. Because the deadline-pressure hypothesis shares some features with both the management and enforcement schools, I argue that it may be viewed as a hybrid of the two.
This article contributes to the international compliance literature in four ways. First, it provides the first study of noncompliance with the Gothenburg Protocol. Because Norway is an important player in regional environmental cooperation to reduce long-range air pollution, 2 understanding the causes of its noncompliance should be interesting to scholars, to Norwegian authorities, and to other Gothenburg parties. In particular, findings concerning the Norwegian case may be useful for explaining other states' noncompliance with Gothenburg targets. Second, and perhaps surprisingly, few (if any) scholars have done what the present article aims to do: derive and empirically assess precise hypotheses concerning the causes of one particular case of noncompliance. Third, although sacrificing breadth, the present analysis is deeper than any previous study of compliance with a protocol under the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-Level Ozone (CLRTAP). 3 Finally, my assessment of hypotheses derived from the management and enforcement schools may contribute to theory development. Much of the compliance literature has revolved around these two schools. Generally, the more important a school or theory is to a field of research, the more interesting it is if hypotheses derived from it prove inconsistent with evidence.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The next section describes the Gothenburg Protocol and its goals. The following section reviews relevant research and develops a set of hypotheses. Thereafter, I confront the management school's three explanations of noncompliance with empirical evidence for Norway. I find that neither ambiguity, incapacity, nor the "temporal dimension" 4 can account for Norway's noncompliance. Next, I show that Norwegian policies are also inconsistent with the enforcement school's expectations. Albeit too late to reach compliance by the 2010 deadline, a Norwegian NO x tax was commissioned in 2007. The ensuing emissions reductions were clearly deeper than in a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, despite no enforcement measures being in place to incentivize such deep reductions.
I then turn to two alternative theories. I show that some evidence suggests that Norway's NO x policies are consistent with an office-incumbent hypothesis. Despite being widely considered the most effective measure, an emissions tax was not introduced until after the 2005 elections, when an environmentalist party gained substantial influence over NO x policies. However, that several other Gothenburg parties conducted even larger NO x emissions reductions from 2007 onward suggests that we should look for a structural explanation rather than a particular one. One such structural explanation is the deadline-pressure hypothesis developed in this article: as the 2010 deadline came closer, the Gothenburg parties (including Norway) considered actions to cut emissions as increasingly urgent.
The Gothenburg Protocol and Norway's NO x Target
The 1999 Gothenburg Protocol was the eighth CLRTAP protocol. Because transboundary air pollution is largely a regional problem, most parties to the convention are European states. These states chose the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) as the institutional foundation for the collaboration. Gothenburg seeks to solve three interconnected environmental problems. The first problem is acidification, which harms life in water and soil and is largely caused by sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions. The second problem is eutrophicationenrichment of water by nutrients (such as agricultural emissions of ammonia, NH 3 ). Eutrophication may change ecosystems, for instance by increasing algae growth and depleting fish stocks. Harmful ground-level ozone is the third environmental challenge targeted by Gothenburg; ground-level ozone stems from NO x reacting with volatile organic compounds (VOCs). 5 Gothenburg includes four emissions target for each state: one target each for NO x , 6 sulfur, 7 VOCs, and ammonia. A majority of the national emissions targets in the Gothenburg Protocol were reached by the 2010 deadline (Table 1) . However, twenty-one of ninety-two targets were not reached by 2010, ten of which were for NO x emissions, eight for ammonia, and three for VOCs. All SO 2 targets were reached by 2010. Table 1 includes all twenty-three European countries that became parties to Gothenburg before the 2010 deadline. Thirteen of these countries failed to meet at least one target by the deadline.
Norway did not comply with its annual emissions target of 156,000 metric tons of NO x by 2010. Norway's 2010 emissions 8 were 177,200 metric tons-approximately 5. See http://www.environment.no/topics/air-pollution/, last accessed November 27, 2017. 6. NO x emissions targets are expressed as nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ). 7. Sulphur emissions targets are expressed as sulphur dioxide (SO 2 ). 8. Unless otherwise stated, all emissions are in metric tons as reported to UNECE in 2015.
13.6 percent above the target (Table 2) . Also, its NO x emissions were declining for most of the period after 1999 (Table 2) . However, the downward trend became substantially steeper after 2007. The low 2009 emissions were likely caused by reduced economic activity during the financial crisis. 9 
Previous Research and Hypotheses
In this section, I present the two main theoretical perspectives in the literature on international compliance and then some recent contributions. I also develop a set of hypotheses. Granted, the enforcement and management schools are not the only explanatory perspectives I could have tested. For example, Franck (1988) argues that equitability is a crucial determinant of compliance (see also Breitmeier et al.'s 2006 " legitimacy" perspective as well as Kim et al. 2017) . Nonetheless, Breitmeier et al.'s (2006, 110-111) summary of findings concerning compliance points specifically at the management and enforcement schools. They thereby suggest that those two schools have sparked more debate than other perspectives.
The Enforcement School
According to the enforcement school's model, states act like unitary, rational actors. Evaluating its options according to its (private) costs and benefits, each state chooses the action that maximizes its net (private) benefit (Aakre et al. 2016 (Aakre et al. , 1317 . Unless (marginal) abatement costs are outweighed by (marginal) abatement benefits, unilateral emissions reductions are economically irrational. Thus defection constitutes each state's dominant strategy: each state will be better off by not contributing to problem solving, regardless of other states' actions. If each state pursues this dominant strategy, the outcome entails suboptimal public goods provision. Therefore, successful treaties restructure states' incentives, by ensuring credible punishment of noncompliers or rewards to compliant states. Because international third-party enforcement is rare, such credibility usually requires that other parties to the agreement have incentives to implement punishment or rewards. Hence prospects for solving malign collective action problems are gloomy. 10 Wettestad (2002, 205-208) characterizes long-range transboundary air pollution as a malign problem.
The Management School
Managerialists argue that nothing inherent or structural in the international system warrants pessimism concerning cooperative efforts. The cornerstone of this reasoning is the claim that "states have a general propensity for compliance" that makes calculated, intentional noncompliance rare (Chayes and Chayes 1993, 175-178) . 11 Thus enforcement measures are not only expensive and inefficient but also unnecessary. Managerialists advocate "softer" mechanisms, such as monitoring, increasing states' capacities, and sharing knowledge and information (Chayes et al. 1995, 84-85) .
The alleged propensity to comply originates in interests (states negotiate and sign treaties aligned with their interests, and noncompliance means jeopardizing (1) your reputation as a reliable partner [Chayes and Chayes 1993, 177, 183-184] ); (2) efficiency (constant recalculation of interests is inefficient, while acting in accordance with agreements reduces costs); and (3) international norms (in international relations, a core norm is to do as promised [Chayes and Chayes 1993, 185; Henkin 1968; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998] Chayes and Chayes (1993) label the "temporal dimension." According to the ambiguity explanation, legal documents may be open to different interpretations. The state capacity explanation argues that financial constraints or insufficient bureaucratic and technical competence may impede goal achievement even in wealthier states (Chayes and Chayes 1993, 194) . 10 . Political malignancy depends on asymmetries, cleavages, and "the "incentives of the underlying game" (Underdal 2002, 15-18 ; see also Mitchell 2006, 78) . 11. Still, Chayes and Chayes (1993, 176) certainly do not deny that deliberate noncompliance sometimes occurs.
The temporal dimension contends that immediate compliance often cannot be expected because policies must be implemented and then acted on by polluters (Chayes and Chayes 1993, 195) . During the time between commitments and their implementation, social and economic changes may alter the conditions for compliance (Aakre et al. 2016 (Aakre et al. , 1317 .
Two Decades of Empirical Research
Since the mid-1990s, several large empirical studies have been conducted; however, the jury is still out concerning which theory has more explanatory power (Perkins and Neumayer 2007) . Summarizing their analyses concerning compliance, 12 Breitmeier et al. (2006, 110-111) state that "neither the shallowness argument of Downs, Rocke and Barsoom (1996) nor the management school of Chayes and Chayes can explain patterns of compliance with international environmental regimes."
Neither do Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1998) provide a clear summary of which theoretical perspective gets more support from their study. 13 Nonetheless, both schools receive some support from different findings; their Figure 15.2 summarizes the findings of their case studies. It lists thirty variables that the authors "believe are the most important factors that affect compliance" ( Jacobson and Brown Weiss 1998, 534-536) . Among them are sanctions, in keeping with the enforcement school's expectations. Scholars of the enforcement camp would, however, not expect most of these factors (e.g., equity, reporting requirements, NGOs) to increase compliance with deep commitments absent enforcement. 14 Unfortunately, Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1998) do not systematically assess depth. They support the management school by suggesting that factors like administrative capacity and monitoring increase compliance. It is, however, difficult to draw clear conclusions concerning which school receives more support because Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1998) do little to distinguish between their thirty explanatory factors' relative importance. 15 Although implementation and effectiveness are the main dependent variables in Victor et al.'s (1998) fourteen case studies of regimes, their findings also shed light on compliance. They argue, "We find that some implementation failures are intentional and that 'harder' measures, such as sanctions, are available and sometimes necessary" ( Victor et al. 1998, x) . 12. Breitmeier et al. (2006) studied the twenty-three international environmental regimes included in the International Regimes Database . 13. Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1998) are the authors of the concluding chapter of Engaging Countries (Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998, eds.), an anthology that includes studies of compliance by eight states and the EU with five international environmental treaties. 14. A commitment is deep to the extent that it requires a party to do more than it would do in the absence of the commitment (Downs et al. 1996, 382) . 15. The exception is a statement that "the strength and health of national political-economic systems and a deep public commitment are the most important ingredients in compliance" (Jacobson and Brown Weiss 1998, 542 ). Underdal and Hanf (2000) provide the most comprehensive study concerning CLRTAP protocols (not including Gothenburg). According to Underdal (2000, 351-353) , a model of states as unitary rational actors predicts patterns of compliance (operationalized as emissions reductions), negotiation positions, and implementation reasonably well.
Hypotheses and Research Design
Given Norway's noncompliance, the management school would expect the Gothenburg Protocol to be ambiguous, Norway's capacity to be inadequate, or time to have been too short to enable Norwegian compliance. I assess the ambiguity explanation by asking if there has been any doubt concerning what Gothenburg obliges Norway to do. If not, the ambiguity explanation is unable to account for Norway's noncompliance. Likewise, I assess the capacity explanation by asking if Norway's capacity was adequate to reach compliance by 2010. If it was, then capacity cannot account for Norway's noncompliance. Finally, I assess Chayes and Chayes' temporal dimension by asking if compliance was realistically within reach, given the time frame and developments between the protocol's adoption and its deadline.
Empirically assessing the enforcement school's explanatory power is less straightforward. Two questions must be answered. First, was the target shallow or deep? Second, were any enforcement mechanisms in place?
Conducting counterfactual judgments is notoriously challenging. However, Norway's NO x target was arguably deep and thus deviates from a BAU scenario: Cost analyses conducted by Norwegian authorities in 1998 and 1999 suggested that compliance with the NO x target in the Gothenburg Protocol would amount to 200-300 million Norwegian kroner (NOK) annually compared to the expected emissions trajectory. 16 Like other UN agreements, CLRTAP protocols have no significant enforcement mechanisms ( Wettestad 2012, 35) . Essentially, Gothenburg consists of emissions targets and timetables (Kokkvoll Tveit, 2017 22 Considering the deep target and no enforcement, the enforcement school would predict Norwegian noncompliance with its NO x target and that Norway would not commission policies to reduce NO x emissions beyond a BAU scenario.
Empirical Analysis I: The Management School
I first consider the management school's ambiguity explanation, then the capacity explanation, and finally the temporal dimension.
Can Ambiguity Explain Norway's Noncompliance?
Gothenburg states, "Each party shall, as a minimum, control its annual emissions of polluting compounds in accordance with the obligations in annex II" (Article 3, paragraph 1). The protocol includes no provision that may relieve Norway of the obligation to reach the target-unless it withdraws from the protocol. Thus the protocol seems unambiguous concerning Norway's NO x obligations.
Public statements from Norwegian authorities suggest that they share this interpretation: under the headline "Did not comply with NO x obligation," the If ambiguity influenced Norwegian NO x policies, it should be known by the then minister in charge. We have little reason to distrust Solheim's statement. Generally, scholars must be careful when using information from political actors who might want to give audiences a certain impression. However, when actors present facts or opinions that may be conceived of as unfavorable to themselves, despite having the possibility to frame them differently, they seem trustworthy. In short, ambiguity was not a barrier to Norwegian compliance.
Can Lack of Capacity Explain Norway's Noncompliance?
In 1999 Thus we do not know how high the total costs of reaching compliance would be. However, given that the first estimate tripled from NOK 20 to NOK 60 per kilogram, we cannot rule out the possibility that the total costs might have tripled as well. Thus, although the numbers are uncertain, total costs may have been in the range of NOK 600-900 million annually.
Compared to the Norwegian government's total spending on environmental measures, NOK 600-900 million is substantial: the Ministry of the Environment's total 2002 budget was approximately NOK 2.8 billion, 27 and it was NOK 5.4 billion in 2013. 28 It seems, however, safe to conclude that Norway did have the funds to cover its compliance costs. When the 2010 national budget was 23. Miljødirektoratet, Klarte ikke innfri NO x -forpliktelsene. Available online at http://tinyurl.com/ zgqy6og, last accessed November 27, 2017. As shown by presented, total incomes were estimated at NOK 974 billion, with a budget surplus of NOK 67 billion. 29 Even more importantly, none of the individuals I interviewed indicated that lack of resources or increased costs caused Norway's noncompliance. When I asked former minister Solheim why Norway did not reach its 2010 NO x target, he replied, "This was all about one thing: mobilizing the political will. Technological barriers and similar factors were negligible."
If increased costs explain some or all of Norway's noncompliance, Solheim would likely have mentioned it. He was minister of the environment until 2012well after Gothenburg's 2010 deadline. Hence Solheim should have every reason to point at factors that might excuse the noncompliance. Neither did former state secretary Axelsen nor former secretary general Rensvik direct our attention to (unexpectedly high) compliance costs, despite ample opportunities to do so during my interviews with them.
What about lack of knowledge? Three important documents concerning Norwegian NO x policies largely agree on (1) how emissions can be reduced and (2) which sources' emissions should be cut. White papers from 1994-1995, 30 2004-2005, 31 and 2016-2017 32 all point to emission limits for road vehicles, using low-NO x technology on the petroleum industry's diesel turbines, international regulation of shipping emissions, retrofitting of modern technology on small coastal vessels, and corresponding measures for land-based industry. This continuity indicates that knowledge concerning sources of and solutions to NO x emissions was reasonably mature already in the mid-1990s.
Finally, can lack of bureaucratic resources explain Norwegian noncompliance? In April 2008, the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) of Norway presented a report on Norwegian authorities' efforts to reduce NO x emissions in accordance with national goals. The OAG concludes that "the authorities control relevant measures, but the implementation of these measures overall has not contributed to significant emissions reductions." The OAG also finds that, "judging by the measures implemented by December 2007, we find it very likely that Norway will not be able to reduce its NO x emissions in accordance with its obligations in the Gothenburg Protocol by 2010" (Riksrevisjonen 2008, 89) .
The ninety-four-page OAG report was the outcome of a thorough review process. Five ministries provided detailed comments to draft versions (Riksrevisjonen 2008, 15, 18, 65 short supply, or the bureaucratic institutions in any way were incapable of carrying out governmental instructions, the auditor general-and former minister Solheim-would almost certainly have directed attention to this problem.
Thus the evidence suggests that lack of capacity was not a problem.
The Management School: The Temporal Dimension
Setting an emissions target and deadline is a decision made under incomplete information. Matching the parties' information and expectations in 1999 with what actually happened can tell us more about the temporal dimension's explanatory power. If the target proved significantly harder to reach than Norwegian authorities expected when the protocol was adopted, Chayes and Chayes' "temporal dimension" may fully or partly explain Norway's noncompliance. Several sources (UNECE 2003; European Commission 2015 , 2016 suggest that during the last ten to fifteen years, scientists have several times increased estimations of diesel vehicles' NO x emissions because emissions under real-life conditions have proven to be higher than emissions under tests. Hence diesel vehicles have failed to live up to a number of EU emissions standards, thereby (potentially) increasing countries' total emissions. Underestimation may make compliance with a quantified emissions target less attainable. For example, if Norwegian NO x emissions in 1999 were significantly underestimated, Norway's authorities may have believed that reaching the 156,000 metric tons target was easier than what proved to be true. Table 3 shows how estimates of Norway's NO x emissions in 1999, 2005, and 2010 have varied over time. 33 This procedure allows comparison of what Norwegian authorities believed were the NO x emissions in those years to the emissions levels that were verified later. 34 Evidently, Norway's total NO x emissions have largely been overestimated. For instance, Norway's emissions in 1999 were estimated at 213,700 metric tons in 2015 but at 239,000 metric tons in 2001. Thus the 1999 emissions reported in 2001 were 25,300 metric tons higher than they were in 2015.
The only instance of underestimation shown in my tables is the 2010 estimate of the 2005 emissions. This estimate is 9,200 metric tons lower than the estimate from 2015. If anything, the significant overestimation could have made compliance more attainable, because it may have (mis)led Norwegian authorities to believe that compliance required even stronger efforts than what proved to be true. Furthermore, new studies suggesting that some diesel 33. As reported to UNECE. 34. Since the most recent estimates are based on the best scientific knowledge available today, I use the estimates reported in 2015 as my baseline. It is, of course, true that any estimate may prove incorrect. Basing my judgments on the best data presently available is, however, the only viable solution.
vehicles' NO x emissions in fact were higher than allowed by the EURO 2 emissions standard were presented as early as 2003, 35 Its 2004 report included no specific advice concerning measures. However, it stressed that BAU would not suffice to reach compliance: "Significantly stronger measures to reduce NO x emissions are required" (Riksrevisjonen 2008, 7, 47-51 (1) the NO x tax that came into force on January 1, 2007, and (2) the so-called NO x agreement between the Norwegian government and several sector organizations that are members of the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise. Most significant NO x emitters are subject to the tax, which covers approximately 55 percent of Norwegian emissions. Companies entering the NO x agreement are exempted from the tax and pay only a lower rate to the so-called NO x fund, which supports NO x -reducing investment. Thus, rather than being collected by the treasury, the revenue is redistributed to emitters able and willing to reduce emissions. 36 The agreement now covers more than 95 percent of taxable emissions. 37 According to the first NO x agreement, the total emissions reductions from the affiliated enterprises should amount to 18,000 metric tons from 2008 to 2010. Certification and consultancy foundation Det Norske Veritas (DNV) verified these reductions. In 2012, having reviewed projects supported by the NO x fund, the Norwegian Environment Agency concluded that the 2008-2010 target was reached and that "the NO x emissions have been reduced by 21,211 metric tons between 2008 and 2011" (Miljødirektoratet 2012) .
Of course, DNV's verifications might be exaggerated or otherwise incorrect. Consultants may be reluctant to draw negative attention to their customers' prestige projects. Likewise, it would be naive to rule out the possibility that the Norwegian Environment Agency might be influenced by the ministry's need to show results.
Conversely, both DNV and the Norwegian Environment Agency are staffed with highly qualified personnel trained to adhere to strict scientific norms. Moreover, their findings are supported by Norway's decreasing emissions. Norway experienced a total NO x emissions reduction of 15,200 metric tons in 2008 and 2011 (Table 2) . Albeit lower than the 21,211 metric tons reduction from projects verified by DNV, this experienced reduction suggests that DNV's and the Environment Agency's claims correspond reasonably well to reported emissions. 36 
Can Domestic Benefits Explain the Strict Post-2006 Policies?
Thus far, I have argued that Norway's policies from 2007 onward reduced emissions beyond BAU. An important foundation for this claim is the fact that Norway was in compliance by 2013 despite an analysis from 1999 that suggested that reaching Gothenburg's NO x target would be NOK 200-300 million annually compared to an expected emissions scenario. Could it be, however, that the reductions were caused by a reevaluation of the domestic costs and/or benefits of NO x emissions reductions?
All the evidence I have collected consistently suggests otherwise. Between 1999 and 2010, Norwegian authorities conducted no new analyses of the total costs of complying with the NO x target. As mentioned previously, a Norwegian Environment Agency report from 2006 argued that compliance required implementation of significantly more expensive measures than were found in 1999. Moreover, in the national budget for 2007, "[the Government proposes] a tax on NO x emissions in order to fulfill the obligations in the Gothenburg Protocol of 1999." 38 Domestic advantages of stricter national NO x regulation are not even mentioned.
Harald Rensvik, former secretary general in the Ministry of the Environment, argues that "the abatement costs of stricter NO x policies were considerable, at least in the short run. I do not think domestic benefits of Norway's emissions reductions can explain why these policies were introduced. As I see it, the crucial determinant was the wish to reach Gothenburg's NO x target." Rensvik's claim is consistent with statements from former minister Solheim and manager of the NO x fund Tommy Johnsen. None of these individuals have incentives to avoid emphasizing the domestic benefits of strict NO x regulation. If anything, we would expect politicians like Solheim to (over-)emphasize domestic benefits of environmental policies, because it could increase voter support.
Moreover, Norway's NO x policies since January 2007 mainly reduce emissions from sea vessels and petroleum installations at the continental shelf (Table 4 ). If domestic damage costs were decision-makers' primary concern, we would rather expect that they target urban emissions.
It thus seems unlikely that the emissions reductions since 2007 are maximizing Norway's net private benefit. Hence Norway's emissions trajectory deviates from BAU and thereby runs contrary to the enforcement school's expectation.
Empirical Analysis III: An Opportunity Lost?
Thus far, this article has found that the two main theories in the compliance literature cannot explain very much of Norway's noncompliance. Granted, the lax policies until 2007 are consistent with the enforcement school. Similarly, the 38. Finansdepartementet. st. prp. nr. 1 (2006 38. Finansdepartementet. st. prp. nr. 1 ( -2007 . Available online at: http://www.statsbudsjettet. no/Upload/Statsbudsjett_2007/dokumenter/pdf/gulbok.pdf, last accessed December 4, 2017. stringent policies in force since 2007 are consistent with the management school. Nonetheless, the enforcement school expects no emissions reductions beyond BAU throughout the period, whereas managerialists would expect Norway to tighten policies early enough to reach compliance. Neither school can explain the change of policy stringency from 2007 onward. Hence, below I develop and consider two explanations that may account for Norway's behavior throughout the period from Gothenburg's adoption in 1999 until its 2010 deadline.
When I asked about his opinion concerning why the NO x tax and the NO x agreement were not introduced earlier, former NO x fund manager Geir Høibye answered, "Even though it is difficult to verify this information, several reliable sources have suggested that Kristin Halvorsen [see Table 5 ] was the fourth minister of finance that handled the proposal of a NO x tax and the first that did not turn it down." Høibye's account suggests that characteristics of politicians in office-or their parties-explain Norway's noncompliance and its NO x policies between 1999 and 2010. Between 2001 and 2005 Øystein Børmer was state secretary and thus political second-in-command in the Ministry of Finance. 39 Having stressed that it is challenging to recall details about specific proposals more than a decade later, he stated, "NO x -reducing measures were discussed throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s…. A NO x tax must have been a part of our assessments continuously throughout our time in office. Børmer thus largely confirms that a NO x tax was indeed considered several years before 2007. When asked about the bureaucracy's opinions concerning a NO x tax versus a NO x agreement, Geir Axelsen, one of Børmer's successors as state secretary in the Ministry of Finance, replied, "Most economists, as well as academic literature on environmental economics, would argue that emissions taxes are more effective than green technology subsidies. Thus, it is rather simple to imagine what advice the bureaucracy gave."
Together, the statements from Børmer and Axelsen strengthen the impression that an emissions tax was high on the agenda in NO x policy discussions both before and after 1999 and that such a tax was proposed several times to the Ministry of Finance's political leadership.
Moreover, politicians and bureaucrats alike were well aware that Norway was heading toward noncompliance. As shown earlier, an expert group argued in 2004 that "significantly stronger measures" were required to reach the NO x target. Their conclusion echoes findings of another expert committee (appointed by the Ministry of Finance) more than a decade earlier: assessing Norway's chances of fulfilling a nonbinding 1988 declaration of a 30 percent NO x emissions reduction by 1998 (see Wettestad 2012, 29) , 41 the committee wrote that "far-reaching measures in addition to current policies are needed." 42 The government's awareness of the need for additional policies is shown by the budget proposal presented in , 1999-2010 under the [Gothenburg] protocol, and will return [to the Storting] with its views." 43 One year later, this assessment was still ongoing. 44 In summary, it had long been known what measures could cut emissions and that additional policies were indeed needed. Moreover, the 2010 deadline had been known since 1999. The question is why the NO x policy shift came only around 2007. What changed?
One factor that did change was who was in charge. After the parliamentary elections in 2005, a cabinet consisting of the Labor Party, the Agrarians (the Centre Party), and the Socialist Left Party replaced another coalition consisting of the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democrats. The latter (minority) coalition won the 2001 elections, whereas the former retained its majority in the 2009 election. (Arter 2008, 111 ; see also Heidar 2001, 69) . As shown by 45 In contrast, the Norwegian Conservatives, like many of their sister parties in Europe, traditionally appeal strongly to business interests (Heidar 2008, 46) . Thus the 2007 NO x policy shift may be explained by the change of government after the 2005 elections: politicians with seemingly good reasons to be reluctant to implement costly yet environmentally effective policies were replaced by politicians giving higher priority to environmental issues.
Evidence from my interview with former secretary general Rensvik suggests that Halvorsen's role is key to understanding the NO x tax introduction. According to Rensvik, "any minister of finance's political maneuvering space is restricted by the ministry's mainstream reasoning on economic policies. However, 43. Miljøverndepartementet, st. prp. 1 (2001 43. Miljøverndepartementet, st. prp. 1 ( -2002 , p. 28. Available online at http://tinyurl.com/ hber222, last accessed December 2010 . 44. Miljøverndepartementet, st. prp. 1 (2002 , p. 67. Available online at: www.regjeringen. no/no/dokumenter/stprp-nr-1-2002-2003-/id295908/, last accessed April 3, 2017. 45. The respondents are asked, "Concerning climate and the environment, which party in your opinion has the best policies?" I believe that Kristin Halvorsen was important in the process that got the NO x tax proposal up and running, for example to support that a first draft was presented to the government." 46 However, although the Socialist Left Party held crucial positions when Norway's NO x regulations were tightened, it is still possible that the same policies would have been implemented by other parties-had these other parties remained in power after 2005. After all, the closer one gets to a deadline, the more urgent it might seem to act to meet it. Thus the increased willingness to reduce NO x emissions from around 2007 may have been conditioned by an increased general awareness of the upcoming 2010 time limit. If the deadline-pressure hypothesis is correct, Norway's emissions should not develop differently from those of other states, because the approaching deadline would affect politicians and bureaucrats in all member countries more or less equally. In contrast, the office-incumbent hypothesis suggests that Norway's emissions trajectory should deviate from the trajectories of other Gothenburg parties.
Although Norway's emissions clearly went down after 2006, the downward trend was even steeper in all other Northern and Western European Gothenburg Protocol parties (Table 7) . Furthermore, the shape of Norway's emissions curve is roughly similar to those of other Northern and Western European states. Both curves in Figure 1 show a steeper downward trend in the latter half of the 2000s.
The verdict seems clear: Table 7 and Figure 1 support the deadline-pressure hypothesis but not the office-incumbent hypothesis.
Conclusions
This article has shown that the management and enforcement schools fail to give a convincing account of Norway's breach of its 2010 NO x target under the Gothenburg Protocol. The management school is unable to explain Norway's 46. Author's interview with Harald Rensvik, Oslo, January 2017. Data are from Karlsen and Aardal (2007, 123; 2011, 140) .
noncompliance: there were no doubts about Gothenburg's contents. Although compliance costs were higher than expected when the protocol was adopted, Norway's capacity to comply seems high nonetheless. Interviews with top politicians and bureaucrats support this conclusion. Furthermore, Norway had adequate time to reach compliance. The enforcement school's expectation that states-unless incentivizedwill not implement costly emissions reductions is clearly inconsistent with Norway's behavior after 2007. Although Norway's material interests concerning NO x emissions did not change significantly around 2007, effective policies were 
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Domestic emissions levels as share of 1999 emissions implemented. Thus the lack of action until the introduction of the NO x tax is consistent with the enforcement school, but the increased policy stringency is not. I thereafter developed inductively, and assessed, two more hypotheses. In accordance with the office-incumbent hypothesis, rapid emissions reductions followed the 2007 introduction of a NO x tax. Such a tax had long been considered; however, it was not imposed until after the 2005 elections, when an environmentalist party gained major influence over fiscal and environmental policies. However, this theory cannot explain why other Gothenburg states also reduced their emissions significantly after 2006. These simultaneous reductions support the deadline-pressure hypothesis: only when the 2010 deadline got close did action to reduce NO x emissions begin to seem urgent to the Gothenburg member countries.
One may well hypothesize that norms, specifically, the pacta sunt servanda norm was the driver of the increased efforts. However, the norm was evidently not strong enough to induce Norwegian emissions reductions early enough to reach compliance by 2010. Similarly, because the lack of strong NO x policies until 2007 is consistent with the enforcement school, one may argue that Norway's policies followed a logic of consequences until 2007, and a logic of appropriateness from then onward (see March and Olsen 1998) . The Norwegian case may suggest that norms and incentives affect state behavior simultaneously but that their relative influence varies over time. Whereas the logic of consequences is the more important driver when the deadline is distant, the logic of appropriateness influence grows stronger when the deadline draws near.
Thus the deadline-pressure hypothesis may be seen as a hybrid of the management and enforcement schools. In contrast with the two theories in their original forms, the synthesized hypothesis is able to account for Norway's policies throughout the period between 1999 and 2010 and for the change from weak to strong NO x policies. Andreas Kokkvoll Tveit is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. His main research interests include international environmental governance and comparative environmental politics.
